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Recent studies of the demand for sports clearly indicate that stars play an important
role in promoting fan interest. However, on theoretical grounds it is controversial if a
star’s talent superiority and/or a star’s popularity drive match attendance and hence
increase gate revenues. Using longitudinal match attendance data of all clubs in the
first German soccer league in a 9-year period, the authors analyze star attraction of
national superstars and of so-called ‘‘local heroes’’ defined as the most valued players
of teams without national superstars. The authors find empirical evidence that these
groups differ in the way they attract fans: whereas superstars enhance attendance both
at home and on the road, the star attraction of local heroes is limited to home games.
In addition, superstars attract fans by outstanding field performances, whereas local
heroes facilitate fan support by mere popularity.
Keywords: superstar effect; consumer demand; soccer; talent; popularity
Introduction
Team composition plays a fundamental role in facilitating fan support: 69% of
the European soccer fans say that their identification with and affiliation to a team
is largely determined by the particular players the team engages (Sportfive, 2004).
Recent studies in the widely and fast growing literature on the demand for sports1
clearly indicate that outstanding players—so-called stars—play an important role
in attracting fans (see e.g., Berri, Schmidt, & Brook, 2004; Berri & Schmidt, 2006;
Hausman & Leonard, 1997; Mullin & Dunn, 2002). Because soccer fans tend to
form attachments to particular teams mostly on the basis of geographic proximity
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(Szymanski, 2003b), we argue that not only well-known superstars but also ‘‘local
heroes’’ may play an important role in enhancing fan interest. Defining superstars
as players whose market values are in the top 2% quantile of the league’s distribu-
tion of market values2 and a ‘‘local hero’’ as the most valued player of a particular
team that has no superstars, we want to shed more light on the still quite obscure
relationship between star players and match attendance. In the theoretical star lit-
erature it is controversial whether stars drive demand by their talent superiority
(see MacDonald, 1988; Rosen, 1981) or simply by their comparably higher popu-
larity (see Adler, 1985). Analyzing longitudinal match attendance data of all clubs
in the first German soccer league during the seasons 1995–1996 through 2003–
2004, we explore star attraction by both a star’s field performance and his popular-
ity. Furthermore, we distinguish between locally dominating stars and national
superstars and we investigate their star attraction both in home games and on the
road. Our data show that local heroes attract fans only in home games, namely
because of their popularity. Superstars, however, facilitate fan support both at home
and on the road—not because of mere celebrity status but rather because of their
outstanding talent. However, robustness checks reveal that a star attraction analysis
requires a precise definition of superstardom.
Related Literature
Noll (1974) was the first to analyze star attraction by introducing a superstar
variable in his match attendance study. This superstar variable captured the effect
of stars on attendance beyond their contribution to team victories. However, it was
not significant. Scully (1974) stated that players can influence club revenues in
Major League Baseball in a twofold way: ‘‘Ability contributions to team perfor-
mance and victories raise gate receipts. (. . .) Additionally, it is possible that some
players may attract fans over and above their individual contribution through the
team’’ (p. 916). Unfortunately, Scully (1974) did not include the latter effect in
his econometric framework. Using a two-equation model, he only related player-
specific performance statistics to team success and, in a second step, team revenue
to the team’s win–loss record and other market characteristics. Scully (1974) did
not consider star attraction by sheer popularity in his econometric framework.
Hausman and Leonard (1997) empirically analyzed superstar effects on team
revenues in professional basketball.3 They found that the mere presence of stars
had a substantial positive impact on club revenues even after controlling for team
quality measured by the number of all-star players on a team. By analyzing all
National Basketball Association (NBA) local and national television ratings as well
as match attendances, Hausman and Leonard (1997) singled out that—back in
1993—the estimated value of Michael Jordan for the NBA was $53 million. The
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study of Hausman and Leonard (1997), however, does not analyze whether the
star’s performance and/or popularity increases team revenues.
Mullin and Dunn (2002) define ‘‘star quality’’ in Major League Baseball as the
residual in a fit of a player’s card prices to performance statistics. They acknowledge
that star quality brings fans to the stadium and impacts team revenues in a significant
way beyond pure field productivity. Mullin and Dunn (2002) determine a player’s
marginal revenue product running a three-step process involving the sequential deter-
mination of (1) the effect of an individual’s performance on team performance,
(2) the effect of team performance on winning percentage, and (3) the impact of win-
ning percentage and a player’s star quality on attendance and hence on revenues.
They found clear evidence that stars may influence gate revenues both by their talent
which is translated into field success and by their popularity.4
Berri, Scmidt, and Brook (2004) investigated the two-sided relationship between
match attendance and both team performance and the team’s mere employment of
star players in the NBA. By choosing a multiplicative model, they regressed a
team’s home gate revenue on team performance, star popularity measured with
received all-star votes, franchise and market characteristics. Their results suggest
that it is performance on the court, not star popularity, which attracts fans.
Berri and Schmidt (2006) extended the study of Hausman and Leonard (1997) via
an examination of road attendance in the NBA. They found evidence of a superstar
externality. Whereas an additional all-star vote increases aggregate road attendance
by only 0.005 fans, each team win leads to an estimated 1,011 increase in attendance
on the road. According to Berri and Schmidt (2006) Michael Jordan’s productivity,
for example, was worth approximately $2.2 million whereas his star appeal only gen-
erated $156,123. Thus, they suggest that showmanship cannot replace actual court
performance. However, the studies of Berri et al. (2004) as well as Berri and Schmidt
(2006) treat team wins as exogenously given by the stars’ talent. They do not analyze
how stars exactly influence team performance.
Stylized Facts on German Soccer
German soccer enjoys high popularity. According to a representative survey of
the Sportfive company, 77% of the German population are interested in soccer. 39%
of them quote that they cannot even imagine a life without soccer (Sportfive, 2004).
This high enthusiasm is reflected in hard facts: the financial turnover of the German
soccer leagues topped €1.5 billion in the 2004–2005 season (Bundesliga, 2006). At
the same time, average match attendance in the first Bundesliga increased to 36,900.
No other soccer league in Europe attracts more fans at the gate than the first Bunde-
sliga (Jones & Boon, 2005).
Most soccer supporters express allegiance to a particular club. Their attendance is
largely an expression of support for that club. Spectators who attend out of purely
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neutral interest tend to represent a minority at soccer matches (Simmons, 1996). Sup-
porters are often organized into supporter clubs, which raise the social component of
a sports event. The geographical distribution of fan bases varies largely between dif-
ferent teams of the league. Although some are more locally rooted, others have sup-
porter clubs all over Germany (Czarnitzki & Stadtmann, 2002). Bayern Munich, for
example, appeals rather nationally. Only 29% of all Bayern fans actually live in
Munich. Hansa Rostock, on the other hand, has strong local roots. 68% of their fan
base lives in Rostock. Even though Bayern Munich had an average home match
attendance of 54,882 in the 2003–2004 season, this only represents 9.1% of Munich’s
male population. In the case of Hansa Rostock, however, match attendance corre-
sponds to 22.9% of the male population in the hometown (see Table 1).
Although Bayern Munich had six superstars with a market value in the top 2%
quantile of the league and six players were nominated for ‘‘Player of the Year’’5 in
the season 2003–2004, Hansa Rostock had none of these superstars. However, sup-
porters of Hansa Rostock are very unlikely to regard a Bayern Munich match as a
perfect substitute for watching ‘‘their’’ team. Explanations for this imperfection
may be found either in economic reasons like travel costs or in the intangible alle-
giance or loyalty to a particular team. Therefore, the market for admission to Hansa
Rostock home games bears features of a local monopoly. Of course, Hansa com-
petes for spectators with other clubs (including those in other leagues) and with
other leisure attractions. No club has a monopoly in an absolute sense (Forrest,
Simmons, & Feehan, 2002). However, the high affiliation of local fans leads to a
situation in which Hansa Rostock has discretion over a level of admission prices.
And, therefore, outstanding players of small teams, such as Hansa Rostock, may
attract fans without having a nationwide appeal. We call them local heroes. A local
hero is defined as the most expensive player in a team, given that his market value
does not belong to the highest 2% of the league. Therefore, the definition of a local
hero does not necessarily imply that the respective player is a homegrown young
player who has just made the starting team. Local heroes may not achieve league-
wide superstardom. However, they take the number one position within their
teams.
We rule out the possibility that both superstars and local heroes exist in the same
team because of the following reasons. First, as already mentioned, fans largely focus
on the team they support. Within a particular team, the star attraction of a superstar is
expected to dominate over the potential star attraction of a local hero. Second,
talented players consciously select a team to maximize their individual utility. In
doing so, not only the salary or the absolute quality of a team but also the relative
position and rank in the team enter their utility function. People in general constantly
compare themselves to others and enjoy a sense of well-being when they out-perform
their peers (see e.g., Clark & Oswald, 1996 or Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). Therefore,
given a certain team quality, we assume a local hero to prefer being the best within a
team instead of being just an interchangeable player among stars.
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To check the robustness of our results, we also run the regressions using broader
star definitions. One alternative model defines the highest 5% quantile of the lea-
gue’s market value distribution as superstars and the two most valuable players
of a team which has no superstars as local heroes. A second alternative model
accounts even the 8% players with the highest market values as superstars and the
three most valuable players in teams without superstars as local heroes. This sensi-
tivity analysis is necessary because it is not a priori clear how many players within
a team may exhibit a particular star attraction or on how many star players viewers
are able to focus simultaneously. On theoretical grounds, we clearly prefer the 2%
superstar definition because the superstar literature argues that one single actor—
the best—dominates the whole market (Schulze, 2003). Based on the fact that the
market for gate attendance may be considered as a local monopoly, it makes sense
to assume a strong concentration of viewer interest on a very restricted number of
players per team.
Star Attraction
The existing theoretical literature on superstars (Adler, 1985; MacDonald, 1988;
Rosen, 1981) suggests two main ways that stars attract fans: by outstanding talent
and exceptional performance and/or by remarkable popularity.
Star Performance
Sherwin Rosen, who wrote a seminal article on ‘‘The Economics of Superstars’’
in 1981, derives the existence of superstars from the premise that consumers con-
sider lower quality as an imperfect substitute for higher quality. According to
Rosen, spectators want to see the best players under the ceteris paribus assumption.
Table 1
Comparison of Bayern Munich and Hansa Rostock in the 2003–2004 Season
Bayern Munich Hansa Rostock
Average match attendance 54,882 22,323
Portion of local attendance 29% 68%
Male population 602,708 97,567
Match attendance in percentage of male population 9.1% 22.9%
Number of superstars 6 0
Number of players in national teams 14 4
Number of players nominated for ‘‘Player of the Year’’ 6 0
Source: Sportfive, 2004; own calculations.
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Watching, for example, a succession of mediocre dribblings does not add up to a
single outstanding dribbling performance. Therefore, small differences in talent
translate into large differences in fan support. In line with Rosen (1981), we postu-
late that stars attract fans and generate disproportionally high match attendance by
their outstanding field performance.
Soccer is a highly interactive game based on the combination of complementary
player skills. Together with relatively low scores and limited ‘‘set’’ plays, the inter-
activity does not facilitate decomposition, record, and measurement (Carmichael,
Thomas, & Ward, 2001). Hence, in soccer we do not have the depth of player per-
formance indicators available for more individualistic North American team sports
such as baseball and basketball (Lucifora & Simmons, 2003). However, one perfor-
mance characteristic that is clearly identifiable and measurable is goal scoring.
Since winning depends on a positive goal difference, goal scoring and preventing
the opposition to score are the critical success factors of a game. In our empirical
study we, therefore, measure field performance by counting the goals and the
assists defined as final pass before a goal is scored. Since forwards and midfielders
are more likely to score than defenders, we divided the performance of each star by
the league average of goals and assists of players in the same position in the corre-
sponding season.6 The sum of weighted goals and assists—namely the weighted
scoring points—of a local hero (SCORELHWP) or of a superstar (SCORESSWP)
in a particular team serve as Rosen talent variables. In addition, we incorporate a
dummy if a team has a local hero or a superstar as goalkeeper.
Star Popularity
In contrast to Rosen (1981), Adler (1985) stated that stars do not necessarily
need to have superior talent. They may just be more popular and attract fans by
their high profile and celebrity status. In Adler’s (1985) logic the appreciation of a
star’s performance increases with the knowledge the consumer has about the star.
The more popular a soccer player is, the easier it is to accumulate this so-called
‘‘consumption capital.’’7 According to Adler (1985) there is more than mere qual-
ity that attracts fans. Mullin and Dunn (2002) describe the star’s popularity of a
baseball player as an intangible characteristic that attracts fans who pay to see these
stars even when their playing performance is not more than mediocre: ‘‘Star quality
thus consists of both reputation based on past performance and charisma above and
beyond actual playing ability’’ (p. 621). Stars may have a ‘‘personal appeal’’ that
activates fan interest even after controlling for their team’s (increased) quality
(Hausman & Leonard, 1997).
To identify the Adler-star effect, we measure a player’s popularity by counting
how often star players are quoted with name and first name in more than 20 Ger-
man newspapers and magazines (MEDIALHP and MEDIASSP).8 Of course, press
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citation rather reflects publicity and is only a proxy of a player’s popularity. How-
ever, publicity such as coverage in tabloids, magazines, or newspapers is strongly
related to popularity (Adler, 2006).
Econometric Framework
Data and Dependent Variable
The analyzed sample contains data on all 18 clubs in the first German league
over nine seasons—beginning with the 1995–1996 season and concluding with the
2003–2004 season. Because of the high profile of the first Bundesliga as the highest
German soccer league, we rule out substantial star attraction for players appearing
in lower leagues.9 The composition of European soccer leagues changes annually
through promotion and relegation. The three best teams from the second Bunde-
sliga are promoted to the first league in the following year, whereas the weakest
three clubs of the first Bundesliga are relegated. Our sample consists of 28 clubs in
total. Some of them played only one season in the highest soccer league (Uerdin-
gen, SSV Ulm) whereas others like Bayern Munich, Hamburg, or Leverkusen were
never relegated.
Studies about the star attraction in sports either concentrate on home games
(Berri, Schmidt, & Brook, 2004; Mullin & Dunn, 2002; Noll, 1974; Scully, 1974)
or away games (Berri & Schmidt, 2006; Hausman & Leonard, 1997). In this article
we analyze star attraction of both home and away attendance in two separate mod-
els, because we assume the star effect to be different based on where the game is
played. The dependent variable for home games is the logarithm of the aggregate
seasonal match attendance. The logarithm of the sum of attendance of all away
games of a particular team denotes the dependent variable analyzing star attraction
on the road.
To identify the relationship between a team’s star performances and a team’s
star popularity with match attendance, a set of control variables is needed to elimi-
nate alternative explanations such as team or market characteristics.
Controls
Besides a simple time trend, we also control for club idiosyncratic factors such
as a team’s reputation (REP20) or the stadium capacity (CAPACITY) and market
characteristics. Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002), who analyze the determinants of
match attendance in the first German soccer league for the seasons 1995–1996 and
1996–1997, identified a strong relationship between reputation, measured by past
field success, and match attendance. Teams that enjoyed success in the past are
expected to have stronger fan support than other teams which had less success. The
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measure REP20 takes into account the performance of a particular team over the
last 20 years according to the following formula:
REP20=
X20
t= 1
18
xt
ﬃﬃ
t
p ð1Þ
xt is the team’s final rank in the championship t years ago. In the case that the team
did not play in the first German league in season t, the corresponding summand is
set equal to zero. By weighting the rankings with the square root of the number of
years past, the index is constructed to reflect the depreciating effect of time (Czar-
nitzki & Stadtmann, 2002).
The aggregate seasonal stadium capacity (CAPACITY) is expected to have a
positive impact on a team’s gate attendance. The variable CAPACITY for home
games is calculated using the weighted average of all sold-out games of a particular
club in a given season, which is then multiplied with the number of home games. In
doing so, we incorporate capacity changes within a season, for example, because of
stadium reconstruction.10 Concerning attendance on the road, the variable CAPA-
CITY is the sum of stadiums’ capacities of all other clubs in a given season. In gen-
eral, we expect that the higher a stadium capacity, the more people may attend a
game without increasing ticket prices. Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2004) found a sig-
nificant positive relationship of stadium capacity and gate revenues in the NBA.
In addition to the mentioned team characteristics, we also use three variables
controlling for specific market characteristics like the male population (MEN), the
unemployment rate (UNEMP) in the hometown, and the competitive balance of the
league (CB).
European soccer fans typically tend to form attachments to particular teams on
the basis of geographic closeness (Szymanski, 2003b). Thus, the size of the popula-
tion in the potential market for a particular team is expected to positively relate to
gate attendance (Borland & MacDonald, 2003; Falter & Pe´rignon, 2000). Schmidt
and Berri (2001) suggest that the size of the metropolitan statistical area is a com-
mon proxy for the size of a team’s market.11 Since soccer is rather a men’s game,12
we only count the number of males in the hometown.13
Borland and MacDonald (2003) claim that attendance at sporting events may
constitute a social outlet for unemployed persons, so that (other things equal) atten-
dance is higher as the rate of unemployment increases. On the other hand, average
income, which is positively associated to match attendance, decreases. Therefore,
the forecasted effect of the unemployment rate on match attendance is not clear.
In addition, we also control for seasonal competitive balance using the Herfin-
dahl index, which measures the concentration of points among the participating
teams. The higher the Herfindahl index, the lower the competitive balance. Accord-
ing to the uncertainty-of-outcome hypothesis (Rottenberg, 1956), higher competi-
tive balance increases fan interest.
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The control variable BUTT denotes a dummy variable for the goalkeeper Hans-
Jo¨rg Butt. Butt is a peculiarity in German soccer, because he scored 23 goals in the
considered time period—all through penalties. In Table 2, the set of variables as
well as descriptive statistics are listed.
Table 2 indicates that teams with superstars have 50.7% more home attendance
and 13.9% more attendance on the road than teams with a local hero. Although a
local hero accounts for almost 3 times as many goals and assists, a superstar accounts
for even more than 6 times as many goals and assists as the league average of players
in the same position. Superstars enjoy high popularity. They have 292 citations in the
German press whereas a local hero is mentioned 155 times on average.
Estimation Approach
Recall from above that our data set contains all teams that played in the first
Bundesliga during the period from 1995–1996 to 2003–2004. It is well known that
panel data structures like ours require special econometric modeling, namely fixed
effects or random effects. We choose the fixed-effects models as our estimation
approach. Let us first quickly restate the underlying assumptions of these models to
show why we believe this choice to be appropriate for our analysis. The fixed-
effects model assumes the following specification:
yit= ai+ x0itb+ eit; ð2Þ
where xit is a K-dimensional vector of explanatory variables.
14 Unlike the fixed-
effects model, the random-effects model does not allow the fixed effects (ai) and
the regressors to be correlated, that is cov(ai,xit) = 0; t= 0; 1, . . . , T . However, in
our empirical setting, this assumption does not seem reasonable. The fact that
Bayern Munich may always have higher attendance than Hansa Rostock can be
expected to be correlated with some regressors. For example, higher attendance
might come from a higher degree of continuity in different fan generations. This
might well be correlated with the team’s reputation. Thus, we expect the fixed-
effects model to provide superior performance. This reasoning is supported by the
empirical results of the Hausman specification test.15
Besides this specification test, we also test for strict exogeneity of our regressors
where we take the results from the Hausman test into account. Following Wool-
dridge (2002), we specify the following regression equation:
yi=ai+ x0itb+w0it+1d+ eit; ð3Þ
where w0it+ 1 denotes a subset of x0itfor club i in the subsequent year t+ 1. A test of
the null hypothesis of strict exogeneity is equivalent to testing H0 : d= 0: First we
have to choose the relevant elements of w0it+ 1. Here, it is crucial to analyze for
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Table 2
Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Teams With
Local Heroes
Teams With
Superstars
Variable Description M SD M SD
Dependent variables
LNATTHOME Logarithm of match
attendance at home
13.03 0.35 13.44 0.39
LNATTAWAY Logarithm of match
attendance on the road
13.18 0.10 13.31 0.12
Independent variables
Star performance
SCRORELHWP Weighted goals and
assists of a local hero
within a team
2.88 2.04 – –
SCORESSWP Weighted goals and
assists of a superstar
within a team
– – 6.15 3.21
GKLH Dummy= 1 if goalkeeper
is a local hero
0.04 0.20
GKSS Dummy= 1 if goalkeeper
is a superstar
– – 0.13 0.34
Star popularity
MEDIALHP Average citations of a
local hero in the
German press (in 100)
1.55 2.75 – –
MEDIASSP Average citations of a
superstar in the German
press (in 100)
– – 2.92 2.25
Control variables
REP20 Reputation: weighted
average of final rankings
in the past 20 years
14.49 12.33 44.10 26.25
CAPACITY Aggregate seasonal
stadium capacity
(in 10,000)
68.53 27.65 84.57 31.55
MEN Male population in the
hometown (in 10,000)
31.30 33.22 36.83 40.16
UNEMP Unemployment rate (in %) 12.30 3.79 12.08 3.85
CB Competitive balance
(Herfindahl-Index in %)
5.93 0.10 5.92 0.11
BUTT Dummy= 1 if goalkeeper
is Hansjo¨rg Butt
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09
Note: The model also includes a time trend, which is not reported.
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which regressors future values might be correlated with eit. Therefore, we decided
to include all of our regressors except for MEN and UNEMP.16 For the latter two,
it seems highly implausible that a shock in current match attendance should be cor-
related with future values for inhabitants or the unemployment rate. Based on the
specification from Equation 3, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis on the
10% level of significance for both attendances at home and on the road.17 Thus,
our regressors may be considered adequate.
A final aspect lies in the nature of our data set: because of promotion and relega-
tion we have an unbalanced panel, as some teams do not always play in the first Bun-
desliga. Because the reason why a team gets promoted or relegated (called attrition)
is not random and therefore expected to be correlated with the idiosyncratic error—
those unobserved factors that change over time and affect match attendance—result-
ing sample selection possibly causes biased estimators. However, through our choice
of a fixed-effects model, this problem is already moderated because fixed-effects ana-
lysis allows for the attrition to be correlated with the unobserved effect (Wooldridge,
2003). Therefore, we explore star attraction only within one team. While model 1
estimates the influence of star attraction on home game attendance, model 2 mea-
sures star attraction of local heroes and superstars on the road.
Results
Table 3 shows all the b-coefficients, the estimated White-robust standard errors
as well as the levels of significance of both home and away games.18
Table 3 reveals that superstar performance significantly increases both home
game and away game attendance. If a superstar scores one more goal than the aver-
age of players in the same position, match attendance at home increases by 1.4%
and on the road by 0.7%.19 A local hero draws viewers into the home stadium by
his popularity, but he does not have a nationwide appeal. MEDIALH does not sig-
nificantly increase attendance on the road. An evaluation of the marginal effects
bSCORESSWP and bMEDIALHP at the corresponding mean values for SCORESSWP and
MEDIALHP shows that based on pure star attraction, superstars have a greater
impact on home attendance than local heroes.20
Concerning the control variables, we see that German soccer enjoys increasing
fan interest. Our data deliver a significant positive time trend. The aggregate seaso-
nal capacity strongly influences match attendance at home and on the road. The
unemployment rate in the hometown is positively related to attendance on the road.
It seems that the lower opportunity costs of unemployed persons dominate over the
negative income effect. But this only applies to away games where travel time is
considerably higher. The greatest, statistically significant impact is derived for
Hans-Jo¨rg Butt concerning home gate attendance. It seems that the peculiarity of a
goalkeeper shooting penalties is an exciting and thus viewer-drawing spectacle.
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The pooling of both superstar and local hero teams allows a direct comparison
of the superstar versus local hero coefficients. The null hypothesis of an equivalent
star attraction of a superstar and of a local hero is rejected both for the performance
and the popularity variables. This indicates that these two star groups significantly
differ in the way they activate fan interest.21
Robustness Analysis
Within this section we perform several robustness tests. Robustness is analyzed
with respect to two different aspects: (1) the number of stars per team and (2) dif-
ferent measures for star performance.
Increasing the Number of Superstars and Local Heroes
A natural starting point for robustness checks is to ask whether our estimation
results would be affected by a change in the number of superstars (or local heroes)
employed by the teams. In the literature there exist many different star definitions; in
Table 3
Estimates of a Team’s Star Attraction (2% Superstar Definition)
Match Attendance at Home Match Attendance on the Road
Variable b-coefficient SE b-coefficient SE
SCORELHWP −0.0046 0.0071 0.0023 0.0028
SCORESSWP 0.0137** 0.0043 0.0066** 0.0028
GKLH −0.0549 0.0939 −0.0137 0.0386
GKSS −0.0606 0.5220 −0.4785 0.0357
MEDIALHP 0.0070* 0.0041 0.0032 0.0043
MEDIASSP −0.0127 0.0091 −0.0036 0.0049
REP20 −0.0048 0.0025 0.0013 0.0014
CAPACITY 0.0070** 0.0008 0.0133** 0.0022
MEN 0.0493 0.0294 −0.0130 0.0087
UNEMP 0.0113 0.0091 0.0109* 0.0050
CB 0.0960 0.1000 0.0797 0.0476
YEAR 0.0114* 0.0056 0.0151** 0.0027
BUTT 0.2757* 0.1295 −0.0254 0.0431
R
2 within 0.39 0.62
F statistic 12.63 24.68
Number of observations 162 162
Note: Significance tests are one-tailed for directional independent variables and two-tailed for control
variables. Standard errors are White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
*Significance at 5%. **Significance at 1%.
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studies of the NBA, superstars are often defined as players who have made the All-
Pro team or the All-Star game for certain times (Berri, Schmidt, & Brook, 2004; Berri
& Schmidt, 2006; Brown, Spiro, & Keenan, 1991; Burdekin & Idson, 1991; Scott,
Long, & Scompii, 1985). Hausman and Leonard (1997) defined two players only,
Michael Jordan and Shaquille O’Neal, as superstars for whom they assumed a positive
externality on the attendance of other clubs. In soccer, Lucifora and Simmons (2003)
defined a superstar as a player who scored more than 0.25 goals per game. However,
Sherwin Rosen, who is seen as the founder of the ‘‘economics of superstars’’, defined
superstars as ‘‘the relatively small numbers of people who earn enormous amounts of
money and dominate the activities in which they engage’’ (Rosen, 1981, p. 845).
Obviously, Rosen (1981) bases his definition of superstardom on the distribution of
earnings among the suppliers of a certain good or service. However, Rosen does not
propose a clear percentage number as ‘‘boundary’’ between ‘‘normal’’ suppliers and
superstars. We, therefore, decided to shift our ‘‘boundary’’ to increase the number of
both superstars and local heroes for a sensitivity analysis. In the first alternative
model, superstars are defined as the 5% most valuable players in the league. The two
most expensive players in teams without superstars are denoted as local heroes.
Finally, we defined the 8% most expensive players in the league as superstars. For this
broader definition of stardom, the number of local heroes per team without superstars
corresponds to three. The estimations from this specification are displayed in Table 5.
If the superstar definition is modified to encompass 5% or even 8%, the field per-
formance of superstars no longer significantly increases attendance (except for home
games in the 8% superstar definition22). The more balanced talent distribution in top
teams could offer an explanation for this finding: Bayern Munich, for example,
engaged 4 to 12 (5% model) or even 7 to 14 (8% model) superstars. It is easier for
the 2% most expensive players to stick out than for a larger group of superstars who
sometimes even have to compete to be in the starting squad. By enlarging the number
of players covered by the superstar definition, the (average) talent of superstars loses
its distinctive ability to differentiate them from the rest of the team.
The popularity variable of local heroes is not very robust. In the original model
MEDIALHP has a significant positive impact on home game attendance. At the
5% superstar level it increases attendance both for home and away games. Con-
cerning the 8% model, only attendance on the road is significantly influenced by
the popularity of local heroes. However, the fact that local heroes draw viewers by
popularity and not by outstanding talent is unambiguous.
High robustness is seen for the control variable YEAR referring to attendance
on the road and for CAPACITY. These variables have positive coefficients at the
1% significance level regardless of the exact star definitions.
A test of joint significance of performance variables, that is SCORESSWP and
GKSS, confirms that superstar performance does not affect match attendance any
more in the 5% and 8% superstar models. As can be seen from Table 6, this result
is independent of the location of the match. This finding may be driven by the fact
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that a larger basis of ‘‘superstars’’ results in the inclusion of nonsuperstars, which
leads to the insignificance of our performance measures.
However, the fact that a broader range for the superstar definition should result
in flawed estimations of star attraction is also mirrored in the specification tests
about strict exogeneity. Whereas we could not reject the assumption of strict exo-
geneity in the 2% definition, the same does not hold for the broader star definitions.
In both cases, strict exogeneity is rejected concerning match attendance on the
road. Thus, we are extremely careful about implications from these estimates. In
particular, it seems as if serial correlation is introduced to the away attendance
model by a move toward a broader star definition. We consider this as further sup-
port for our choice of a narrow star definition.
Having discussed the consequences of relying on varying databases, we now
turn to a robustness check of the applied measures themselves.
Alternative Measures for Star Performance
Our choice of the position-weighted scores (measured by the sum of goals and
assists) was motivated by the ease of evaluating goals and assists. As noted above,
Table 4
Estimates of a Team’s Star Attraction (5% Superstar Definition)
Match Attendance at Home Match Attendance on the Road
Variable b−coefficient SE b−coefficient SE
SCORELHWP −0.0022 0.0062 −0.0012 0.0028
SCORESSWP 0.0042 0.0052 0.0005 0.0022
GKLH 0.0392 0.0626 −0.0095 0.0193
GKSS 0.0387 0.0871 −0.0461* 0.0217
MEDIALHP 0.0262* 0.0129 0.0168** 0.0047
MEDIASSP 0.0091 0.0113 0.0026 0.0056
REP20 −0.0054* 0.0023 0.0012 0.0013
CAPACITY 0.0058** 0.0011 0.0131** 0.0023
MEN 0.0456 0.0259 −0.0101 0.0080
UNEMP 0.0125 0.0093 0.0113* 0.0056
CB 0.0618 0.1043 0.0861* 0.0432
YEAR 0.0044 0.0061 0.0124** 0.0028
BUTT 0.1815 0.1079 −0.0417 0.0218
R2 within 0.34 0.60
F statistic 6.83 31.32
Number of observations 162 162
Note: Significance tests are one-tailed for directional independent variables and two-tailed for control
variables. Standard errors are White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
*Significance at 5%.**Significance at 1%.
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Table 5
Estimates of a Team’s Star Attraction (8% Superstar Definition)
Match Attendance at Home Match Attendance on the Road
Variable b-coefficient SE b-coefficient SE
SCORELHWP −0.0069 0.0107 0.0006 0.0042
SCORESSWP 0.0105 * 0.0061 0.0030 0.0025
GKLH 0.0227 0.0385 −0.0195 0.0141
GKSS −0.0246 0.0351 0.0008 0.0177
MEDIALHP 0.0675 0.0505 0.0352* 0.0174
MEDIASSP 0.0065 0.0110 0.0067 0.0050
REP20 −0.0052* 0.0021 0.0007 0.0012
CAPACITY 0.0062** 0.0011 0.0138** 0.0023
MEN 0.0483 0.0245 −0.0120 0.0076
UNEMP 0.0120 0.0087 0.0098 0.0056
CB 0.0556 0.1043 0.0587 0.0436
YEAR 0.0056 0.0059 0.0115** 0.0028
BUTT 0.2599** 0.0868 −0.0426 0.0246
R2 within 0.37 0.60
F statistic 7.31 31.00
Number of observations 162 162
Note: Significance tests are one-tailed for directional independent variables and two-tailed for control
variables. Standard errors are White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
*Significance at 5%. **Significance at 1%.
Table 6
Joint Significance Tests
Match Attendance
at Home
Match Attendance
on the Road
p value F statistic p value F statistic
Main model (2% superstars)
Joint signficance of a local hero’s performance 0.35 0.7060 0.63 0.5366
Joint significance of superstar’s performance 7.05** 0.0010 8.40** 0.0004
Alternative models
5% superstar definition/two local heroes
Joint signficance of a local hero’s performance 0.27 0.7609 0.17 0.8417
Joint significance of superstar’s performance 0.38 0.6818 2.57+ 0.0810
8% superstar definition/three local heroes
Joint signficance of a local hero’s performance 0.45 0.6387 1.04 0.3564
Joint significance of superstar’s performance 1.68 0.1909 0.72 0.4872
+Significance at 10%. *Significance at 5%. **Significance at 1%.
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the talent of soccer players is rather blurred, because the game specific characteris-
tics complicate the measurement of individual performance. Therefore, we decided
to apply another performance measure to test the robustness of the performance
variables. On every match day, Kicker soccer magazine publishes the ‘‘team of the
day,’’ comprising the 11 players who played best. We estimated a model that
includes the number of appearances of a superstar or local hero in the BEST11
team. An important advantage of this measure is that players of each tactical posi-
tion have similar chances to be elected for the BEST11 team. However, a disadvan-
tage of the BEST11 variable is the fact that it is published by the same source that
estimates the players’ market values.
Table 7 shows the estimates of a team’s star attraction using the BEST11 vari-
able instead of scores. As in the original model, superstars are defined as the 2%
quantile in the league’s market value distribution whereas the most valuable player
in teams without superstars counts as local hero.
Table 7 illustrates that the average number of nominations of superstars for the
‘‘team of the day’’ significantly influences their team’s gate attendance both at
home and on the road. This confirms our results from Table 2. The use of another
Table 7
Estimates of a Team’s Star Attraction Using
BEST11 as Performance Indicator
Match Attendance at Home Match Attendance on the Road
Variable b-coefficient SE b-coefficient SE
BEST11LH −0.0038 0.0069 −0.0030 0.0040
BEST11SS 0.0212 ** 0.0068 0.0153 ** 0.0037
GKLH −0.0392 0.0971 −0.0179 0.0277
GKSS −0.0747 0.0533 −0.0311 0.0276
MEDIALHP 0.0065 0.0046 0.0037 0.0032
MEDIASSP −0.0092 0.0087 −0.0080* 0.0042
REP20 −0.0059* 0.0027 0.0002 0.0013
CAPACITY 0.0067 ** 0.0008 0.0132 ** 0.0020
MEN 0.0532 0.0280 −0.0092 0.0071
UNEMP 0.0129 0.0093 0.0113 0.0049
CB 0.0731 0.1014 0.0738 0.0418
YEAR 0.0104 0.0055 0.0152 ** 0.0024
BUTT 0.2557 0.1312 −0.0336 0.0312
R2 within 0.37 0.65
F statistic 13.13 26.35
Number of observations 162 162
Note: Significance tests are one-tailed for directional independent variables and two-tailed for control
variables. Standard errors are White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
*Significance at 5%. **Significance at 1%.
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performance measure does not change the finding that only superstars are able to
draw spectators by their outstanding field performance. However, in analyzing the
popularity variables we see that the results change. MEDIALHP no longer has sta-
tistical significance, and the press citations of superstars decrease attendance on the
road. The latter effect may be explained from the ceteris paribus interpretation of
the coefficient estimates: the negative coefficient on MEDIASSP refers to a change
of media citations while holding the number of nominations for the ‘‘team of the
day’’ constant. The results in Table 6 indicate that nonperformance related media
citations of superstars lowers attendance on the road. It seems that publicity might
not improve attendance per se.23 Alternatively, we could say that a superstar substi-
tuting media presence for performance will lower his positive externality for
matches on the road.24
Conclusion
Analyzing seasonal match attendance data we find evidence for star attraction in
the first German soccer league. However, the exact channel of generating this attrac-
tion (by field performance or popularity) largely differs depending on firstly whether
a player is a nationwide superstar or a local hero and secondly whether attendance at
home or on the road is investigated. Although superstars enhance attendance both at
home and on the road, the star attraction of local heroes is limited to home games.
Superstars attract fans by outstanding field performances, whereas local heroes facili-
tate fan support by mere popularity. Robustness tests reveal that the estimations of
star attraction are influenced by the chosen star definition. If the superstar and local
hero categories are extended to encompass larger numbers of players, that is, the
superstar category to account for the 5% or 8% (instead of 2%) of the most expen-
sive players of the league, specific performance-related star attraction is no longer
observed in the data. Superstardom is a ‘‘small number’’ phenomenon, just as postu-
lated in the economic star literature (see Rosen, 1981).
Our results indicate that superstars produce a positive externality for home
teams when playing on the road. This is an important finding with respect to the
question of who should bear the costs of paying these superstars (see also the recent
article by Berri & Schmidt, 2006). More precisely, this externality gives rise to a
de facto system of revenue sharing in the German Bundesliga between teams that
employ superstars and those that do not. Based on our results, the value of the aver-
age superstar externality was about €430.000 per season.25 Furthermore, our results
show that there is a trade-off for a league between an increase of its level of compe-
titive balance and allowing for dominant teams.
Regarding future research, we believe that investigating two aspects would be
especially worthwhile. First, it would be interesting to see whether the positive
externality imposed by visiting superstars varies with the number of superstars in
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the home team, allowing for a more precise quantification of the value of this
externality. A second aspect relates more directly to the superstars themselves:
although our study provides new evidence for different types of star attraction in
German soccer, we do not explicitly address transitions between local heroes and
superstars. We are not able to link individual career paths with the team’s financial
or field success. Therefore, it still remains to be examined how player-specific star
attraction changes as rising stars climb the career ladder.
Notes
1. See Szymanski (2003a) or Borland and MacDonald (2003) for a review.
2. The market values used were collected from special editions of the Kicker soccer magazine at
the beginning of each season. For the 1997–1998 season, the market values were published in the weekly
Kicker edition No. 61 in 1997.
3. Brown, Spiro, and Keenan (1991); Burdekin and Idson (1991); and Scott, Long, and Scompii
(1985) already controlled for the effect of a team’s star attraction in their analyses of match attendance
in the NBA prior to Hausman and Leonard (1997). However, the existence of a potential superstar effect
was not their main focus. Of these studies, only Brown, Spiro, and Keenan (1991) were able to find a
statistically significant relationship between match attendance and the number of stars in a team.
4. Note that the term ‘‘star quality’’ from above only reflects the popularity aspect of stars.
5. The Kicker soccer magazine organizes an annual voting for ‘‘Player of the Year.’’ At the end of
the 2003–2004 season, approximately 3,400 sports journalists were asked to vote for any player in the
German league or any German player in any other league.
6. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the standardization of performance
according to the tactical position.
7. The notion ‘‘consumption capital’’ was introduced by Stigler and Becker (1977).
8. The database used contains quality nationwide newspapers (including Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, S€uddeutsche Zeitung, Stuttgarter Zeitung, Hamburger Abendblatt, Die Welt, taz, Berliner Morgen-
post, Financial Times Deutschland) and weekly magazines (including Der Spiegel, Stern, and Bunte).
9. The average match attendance in the second Bundesliga is approximately one third of the match
attendance in the first Bundesliga.
10. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing the issue of stadium reconstruction to our
attention.
11. However, an anonymous referee as well as Buraimo, Forrest, and Simmons (2006) state that the
metropolitan statistical area may be a flawed measure for market size. For example, if a club is located
in a town with twice the population of another, it cannot be considered as having double market size.
The bigger the town, the higher the mean travel costs for residents to reach the stadium, implying that
the ticket demand will not linearly increase with the size of the hometown. Therefore, Forrest, Simmons,
and Feehan (2002) or Buraimo, Forrest, and Simmons (2006) employed modern GIS software to mea-
sure population within a certain distance from the stadium and also included a measure of competition
from neighboring clubs. Unfortunately, we could not obtain the corresponding data for Germany.
12. Stollenwerk (1996) shows that the share of women among spectators in Bundesliga matches
usually varies between 3% and 18%.
13. This further enables us to control for differences in relative shares of men in the population.
14. The reader should note that we are implicitly assuming that superstars and local heroes affect a
team’s capacity to attract additional consumer demand in an additive way only. Of course, as it was rightly
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pointed out to us by an anonymous referee, it might also be that star performance influences attendance in
a multiplicative way, as well. However, the fact that our model contains several discrete explanatory vari-
ables prevents us from specifying a Log/Log-specification (where the associated coefficients would have
to be interpreted as elasticities).
15. Performing the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978), which compares the fixed-effects
model with the random-effects model, we can reject the null hypothesis for home and away games on a
1% level of significance. The Hausman specification test, therefore, confirms that team-level effects are
inadequately modeled by a random-effects model because they are correlated with the explanatory
variables.
16. For example, future values of media coverage might be correlated with current shocks in match
attendance because a positive shock in match attendance might lead the media to increase their coverage
of a team’s players as they could expect a higher interest from consumers. Similar relationships could be
derived for other regressors.
17. If a broader definition of superstars is chosen (see section about the robustness checks), the null
hypothesis of strict exogeneity is rejected at the 5% significance level. We take this as an additional con-
firmation of a rather narrow definition of stars.
18. Whenever correlational designs are used, concerns about internal validity such as possible
reverse causality may be raised. However, the issue of reverse causality (impact of revenues on the num-
ber of stars a team engages) is appeased by the lag structure of our model. We identify the stars in the
beginning of a season, whereas the performance, popularity, and attendance data is collected during the
season.
19. The fact that the scores of superstars even increase attendance on the road may be puzzling at first
glance. On one hand, match attendance in German soccer is generally dominated by home-team supporters
who want ‘‘their’’ team to win (see e.g., Borland & MacDonald [2003] for the overwhelming evidence that
attendance is positively related to home-team winning percentage). The more goals the opposite stars
score, the lower the winning probability of the home team becomes, which then decreases demand. On the
other hand, a greater value of SCORESSWP should be related to a higher expected match quality, which
would increase match attendance. Based on our results, it seems as if the latter effect dominates. We view
this result to be in line with previous results that show the dominating influence of team quality variables
for match attendance (see Garcia & Rodriguez [2002] for evidence from Spanish soccer). In the NBA,
Berri and Schmidt (2006) found a positive impact of the winning percentage of the visiting team on atten-
dance on the road.
20. The average marginal effect of SCORESSWP is 8.4% (0.0137× 6.15), whereas the popularity of
the local hero increases home attendance only by 1.1% (0.007× 1.55).
21. Slope equality of SCORELHWP and SCORESSWP (MEDIALHP and MEDIASSP) is rejected
at the 5% level of significance. In addition, we also tested for the joint significance of the performance
measures regarding home and away match attendance. Whereas the null hypothesis could be rejected for
SCORESSWP and GKSS, the same did not hold for SCORELHWP and GKLH. The detailed results are
available from the authors on request.
22. However, based on test results on joint significance (see Table 6), we do not put too much
emphasis on this finding. The same applies to the negative coefficient of GKSS in Table 4.
23. The consumer response possibly differs between positive and negative publicity. For the latter
see, for example, Dean (2004).
24. The reader might wonder why a similar reasoning would not apply to our specification including
SCORESSWP. However, recall that the BEST11 measure accounts for a potential bias of SCORESSWP
toward midfielders and strikers in spite of our standardization with respect to the player’s position. Thus,
it is possible that the exceptional performance of a defender might be the reason for an increased number
of media citations which would not automatically be reflected in an increase in SCORESSWP. As
argued earlier, such a performance of a defender would most likely result in a nomination for the ‘‘team
of the day.’’ In other words, for midfielders and strikers, SCORESSWP should be a much better
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predictor for a nomination for the ‘‘team of the day’’ than for defenders and goalkeepers. As a result, the
impact of MEDIASSP differs for the BEST11 and SCORESSWP specifications because, under the
ceteris paribus condition, an increase of MEDIASSP might well refer to different types of media cover-
age in the two models.
25. Superstars increase match attendance on the road by 4%, which results in 24,484 tickets sold
additionally. Given an average admission price of €17.50, this totals €428,470.
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